We study the strength of set-theoretic axioms needed to prove Rabin's theorem on the decidability of the MSO theory of the infinite binary tree. We first show that over the second-order arithmetic theory ACA0, the complementation theorem for nondeterministic tree automata is equivalent to a statement expressing the determinacy of all Gale-Stewart games given by Bool(Σ 0 2 ) sets. It follows that the complementation theorem is provable from
Introduction
Rabin's decidability theorem (Rabin 1969) says that the monadic second order (MSO) theory of the infinite binary tree {0, 1}
* with the left and right successor relations is decidable. In the words of the book "The Classical Decision Problem" (Börger et al. 1997 , Chapter 7), Rabin's result "is one of the most important decidability theorems for mathematical theories and has numerous applications in several areas of mathematics and computer science".
Unlike other prominent decidability results, such as the ones for Presburger arithmetic, real-closed fields or even the MSO theory of (N, ≤), Rabin's theorem appears likely to involve significant logical strength, in the sense of being unprovable without axioms asserting the existence of very abstract and complicated sets. This is suggested by the fact that MSO on {0, 1}
* is able to express the determinacy of certain infinite games with Borel winning conditions, and such determinacy is used in typical modern proofs of Rabin's theorem, dating back to (Gurevich and Harrington 1982) . Determinacy principles are notorious for requiring very large logical strength.
Since Rabin's theorem is so ubiquitous in computer science, and since its proofs are still perceived as "difficult", it seems to us worth asking whether all proofs of the theorem must necessarily involve strong set existence axioms. A natural follow-up challenge is to measure the strength of the required axioms in more precise terms.
The framework of reverse mathematics (see (Simpson 2009 )) offers a natural way of measuring the logical strength of a theorem. The idea is that many mathematical theorems can be formalized in the language of second-order arithmetic, a foundational axiomatic theory used already by Hilbert and Bernays. The most important axiom of second-order arithmetic is the comprehension scheme, stating the existence of any set of natural numbers defined by firstand second-order quantification over N. Reverse mathematics proceeds by analyzing various mathematical statements and proving their equivalence, over a suitable weak base theory, to some rather limited form of comprehension. Most mathematical theorems analyzed in this fashion have turned out to require no more than the theory ACA0 allowing only arithmetical comprehension, that is, the existence of sets defined without any second-order quantifiers. Theorems requiring strictly more than Π 1 1 -comprehension, or the existence of sets defined in terms of one second-order quantifier, are quite exceptional. One such exception is the famous graph minor theorem, cf. (Friedman et al.) . A less known example is provided in (Mummert and Simpson 2005) , where a theorem in general topology is proved equivalent to Π 1 2 -comprehension. Determinacy theorems are a more extreme exception. Π 1 1 -comprehension is barely enough to prove the determinacy of games in which the winning condition is the intersection of an open set and a closed set. Π 1 2 -comprehension proves that Fσ games are determined (Tanaka 1991) , but can no longer prove the determinacy of games given by arbitrary boolean combinations of Fσ sets (essentially 1 ). For arbitrary boolean combinations of F σδ sets, proving determinacy requires going beyond second-order arithmetic, an immensely strong theory in most other respects (Montalbán and Shore 2012) .
Summary of results
The aim of this paper is to analyze, reverse mathematics-style, the logical strength of Rabin's theorem. We first focus our attention on the complementation theorem for nondeterministic automata on infinite trees, which is the key ingredient in typical proofs of Rabin's theorem. We prove that the complementation theorem is equivalent over ACA0 to the determinacy of Gale-Stewart games given by arbitrary boolean combinations of Σ 0 2 (i.e., Fσ) sets. Using earlier work on determinacy, we conclude that the complementation theorem is provable in Π 1 3 -, but not Π 1 2 -or even ∆ 1 3 -comprehension. We then consider Rabin's decidability result itself. Using the work of (MedSalem and Tanaka 2007), we prove that over Π 1 2 -comprehension, already the statement "the Π 1 3 fragment of the MSO theory of {0, 1}
* is decidable" is equivalent to the determinacy of arbitrary Bool(Σ 0 2 ) games, which makes it unprovable in ∆ 1 3 -comprehension. On the other hand, any version of the decidability theorem that can be stated in second-order arithmetic follows from Π 1 3 -comprehension. The final part of our work relies on techniques developed in Michael Möllerfeld's PhD thesis (Möllerfeld 2002) , which links Π 1 2 -comprehension with an arithmetical version of the µ-calculus. Using a slight strengthening of Möllerfeld's results, we show that over Π 1 2 -comprehension the following conditions are equivalent:
• the complementation theorem for nondeterministic tree automata, • Rabin's decidability theorem,
• the determinacy of all Bool(Σ 0 2 ) games, • the positional determinacy of all parity games and
• a purely logical reflection principle: "all Π 1 3 sentences provable using Π 1 2 -comprehension are true". Note that the unprovablity of this reflection principle in Π 1 2 -comprehension follows from Gödel's second incompleteness theorem.
Related work
To the best of our knowledge, the axiomatic strength needed to prove Rabin's theorem has not yet been explicitly studied. However, a closely related topic was recently considered in (Das and Riba 2015) . The authors propose a complete axiomatization of MSO on the binary tree. The main component of their axiomatization is the comprehension scheme for all MSO formulas (in the language of S0, S1, as opposed to the richer language of second order arithmetic with the coding power provided by + and ·). However, they also raise the question whether a more restricted form of comprehension would suffice, and even express a "suspicion" on this topic -about which reverse-mathematical methods have something to say (cf. (Das and Riba 2015, Section VII A) and see the remark after Theorem 4.2 in the present paper.)
More broadly speaking, our work connects two strands of research which have until now been largely separated. One of these consists of various efforts to improve or clarify the determinacybased approach to proving Rabin's theorem, originally introduced in (Gurevich and Harrington 1982) . The list of such efforts is quite long, though most of the time we can rely on the streamlined presentation of (Thomas 1997) . Two specific ideas directly connected to our paper are the parity games of (Emerson and Jutla 1991) and the method of "positionalizing" winning strategies developed in (Klarlund and Kozen 1995) and (Klarlund 1994) .
The second research area we draw upon concerns the reverse mathematics of determinacy principles. Results on determinacy at the level of open and closed sets are classical and reported in (Simpson 2009, Chapters V.8 and VI.5) . However, the understanding of determinacy for games given by Σ 0 2 or Σ 0 3 sets and their boolean combinations has progressed greatly in the last 15 years. Our focus is on the determinacy of Bool(Σ 0 2 ) games, which has been studied e.g. in (Tanaka 1991; Möllerfeld 2002; Nemoto et al. 2007; Tanaka 2007, 2008; Heinatsch and Möllerfeld 2010 ). An extensive discussion of the results relevant to our work can be found in Section 4.
In the present paper we do not introduce thoroughly new techniques in automata theory or in the reverse mathematics of determinacy. Our aim is rather to point out how automata theory and reverse mathematics can interact with one another, leading to results that seem interesting from the perspective of both areas.
Structure of the paper
Section 2 presents the necessary background in reverse mathematics, automata theory and games. In Section 3, we give a first approximation of the logical strength of the complementation theorem for tree automata, proving that it implies Bool(Σ 0 2 ) determinacy and is implied by the positional determinacy of all parity games. We review some known results on the reverse mathematics of determinacy principles in Section 4. We then use those results to get a more exact characterization of the strength of the complementation theorem for automata (Section 5) , and to analyze the strength of Rabin's decidability theorem (Section 6). Our final result linking complementation for automata, decidability of MSO, and determinacy statements with a reflection principle for Π 1 2 -comprehension is discussed in Section 7.
Basic notions 2.1 Second-order arithmetic
Second-order arithmetic is a natural framework for studying the strength of axioms needed to prove theorems of countable mathematics, that is, the part of mathematics concerned with objects that can be represented using no more than countably many bits of information. In particular, this encompasses the vast majority of the mathematics needed in computer science. The two-sorted language of second-order arithmetic, L2, contains first-order variables x, y, z, . . ., intended to range over natural numbers, and secondorder variables X, Y, Z, . . ., intended to range over sets of natural numbers. L2 includes the usual arithmetic functions and relations +, ·, ≤, 0, 1 on the first-order sort, and the ∈ relation which has one first-order and one second-order argument.
Full second-order arithmetic, Z2, has axioms of three types: (i) axioms stating that the first-order sort is the non-negative part of a discretely ordered ring; (ii) comprehension axioms, or sentences of the form
where ϕ is an arbitrary formula of L2 not containing the variable X; (iii) the induction axiom,
The language L2 is surprisingly expressive, as the first-order sort can be used to encode arbitrary finite objects and the secondorder sort can encode even such objects as complete separable metric spaces, continuous functions between them, and Borel sets within them (cf. (Simpson 2009, Chapters II.5, II.6, V. 3)). Moreover, the theory Z2 is very strong: almost all theorems from a typical undergraduate course that are expressible in L2 can be proved in Z2. In fact, the basic observation underlying the programme of reverse mathematics (Simpson 2009 ) is that many important theorems are equivalent to various fragments of Z2, where the equivalence is proved in some specific weaker fragment, referred to as the base theory.
The most commonly used base theory is RCA0, which guarantees only the existence of decidable sets. For relatively strong theorems such as the ones studied in this paper, a reasonable base theory is ACA0, the fragment of Z2 obtained by restricting the comprehension scheme to instances where the formula ϕ is arithmetical, that is, does not contain second-order quantifiers (second-order free variables are allowed). Yet stronger fragments of Z2 can be obtained by allowing comprehension for ϕ with a fixed number of second-order quantifiers. A formula is Π 
where both ϕ and ψ are Π 
where ϕ is Π In this paper, the most prominent theory is Π 1 2 -CA0. We present some important principles provable in Π 1 2 -CA0. The first two principles are related to countable sequences of sets. Such a sequence Xi i∈N can be represented by a single set X if we let
where ·, · is some standard pairing function. We can then write X ∈ Xi i∈N if there is some i such that X = Xi. A sequence Xi i∈N can be regarded as a countable model for the language L2, with N as the first-order universe and {Xi} i∈N as the second-order universe. Such a model is called a countable coded model and typically denoted M . ∀X ∃M (M is a β2-model and X ∈ M ).
The final principle we have to discuss concerns fixpoints of iterations of certain operators on sets. A ∆ 1 2 operator is given by a pair of Π 1 2 formulas ϕ(x, X), ψ(x, X) (possibly with parameters) such that ∀x ∀X (ϕ(x, X) ⇔ ¬ψ(x, X)).
We think of ϕ and ψ as defining an operator Γ ϕ,ψ on sets that maps a set X to {x ∈ N : ϕ(x, X)}.
Definition 2.5. The axiom scheme asserts the following for every ∆ 1 2 operator given by formulas ϕ, ψ: there exists a prewellordering (reflexive transitive relation connected on its field) with field P such that
If , P are as in Definition 2.5, then P can be regarded as a fixed point of the operator X → Γ ϕ,ψ (X) ∪ X generated inductively in the usual way. If ϕ is a Σ 1 1 formula, then ψ can of course be simply ¬ϕ; the scheme consisting of the instances of ∆ Notational convention. As above, we will use the letter N to denote the natural numbers as formalized in second-order arithmetic, that is, the domain of the first-order sort. On the other hand, the symbol ω will stand for the concrete, or standard, natural numbers. For instance, given a theory T and a formula ϕ(x), "T proves ϕ(n) for all n ∈ ω" will mean "T ϕ(0), T ϕ(1), . . .", which does not have to imply T ∀x ∈ N ϕ(x)".
The letter n will be used exclusively to denote elements of ω. As formal variables of the first-order sort, we will typically use x, y, z, . . ., but sometimes also i, j, k, or other lowercase letters different from n.
Automata and MSO
The study of monadic second order logic on the infinite binary tree relies heavily on the theory of automata on infinite words and infinite trees. Our presentation of automata theory and MSO is based on (Thomas 1997) , with some modifications.
Given a finite set Σ (the so-called alphabet), a word over alphabet Σ is simply a mapping f : N → Σ. A tree (or more precisely, labelled binary tree) over Σ is a mapping T : {0, 1} * → Σ, where {0, 1}
* stands for the set of all finite binary strings 2 . Note that words and trees over Σ have another natural representation as structures with universe N resp. {0, 1}
* and card(Σ) disjoint unary relations whose union is the universe.
Definition 2.7 (Nondeterministic Parity Word Automaton). A nondeterministic parity word automaton over a finite alphabet Σ is a tuple A = Σ, Q, q I , ∆, rk where Q is a finite set of states, q I ∈ Q is the initial state, ∆ ⊆ Q × Σ × Q is the transition relation, and rk : Q → N is the rank function.
We use the letter δ to denote individual transitions of A, i.e. elements of ∆.
A run of a nondeterministic parity word automaton A on a word f over Σ is a labelling ρ : N → ∆ which is consistent, that is for
and q0 = q I , that is the first state in the run is the initial state of the automaton. Intuitively, the transitions in a run have to be such that after moving from a position i to the successor position i + 1, the run continues from the state qi+1 indicated by the transition ρ(i).
A run ρ on a word f is accepting if the states q0, q1, . . . along this run satisfy the parity acceptance condition:
A word f is accepted by the automaton A if there exists an accepting run of A on f .
Definition 2.8 (Nondeterministic Parity Tree Automaton). A nondeterministic parity tree automaton over a finite alphabet Σ is a tuple A = Σ, Q, q I , ∆, rk where Q is a finite set of states, q I ∈ Q is the initial state, ∆ ⊆ Q × Σ × Q × Q is the transition relation, and rk : Q → N is the rank function.
If a transition ∆ δ has the form (q, a, q0, q1), we may write q0 = δ(a, q, 0) and q1 = δ(a, q, 1). The idea is that if the automaton is in some vertex of the tree and reads the letter a while in state q, it may use δ to move simultaneously to the left son of the vertex in state q0 and to the right son in state q1.
A run of a nondeterministic parity tree automaton A on a tree T over Σ is a labelling ρ : {0, 1}
* → ∆ which is consistent, that is for every vertex v ∈ {0, 1}
and q = q I where denotes the empty string. Intuitively, the transitions in a run have to be chosen so that after moving from a vertex v in the tree to its sons v0, v1, the run continues from the states qv0, qv1 indicated by the transition ρ(v).
A run ρ on a tree T is accepting if for each branch π of the tree, π ∈ {0, 1} N , the states along this branch, q π 0 , q π 1 , . . . satisfy the parity acceptance condition: lim inf i∈N rk(q π i ) is even.
A tree T is accepted by the automaton A if there exists an accepting run of A on T .
Definition 2.9 (Deterministic automaton). We call a nondeterministic parity word automaton A = Σ, Q, q I , ∆, rk a deterministic word automaton if the transition relation ∆ is a graph of a function Q × Σ → Q. Similarly, we call a nondeterministic parity tree automaton A = Σ, Q, q I , ∆, rk a deterministic tree automaton if the transition relation δ is a graph of a function Q × Σ → Q × Q.
Note that a deterministic word (resp. tree) automaton has exactly one run on each word (resp. tree). We consider monadic second order logic MSO over the structure ({0, 1} * , S0, S1), where S0 and S1 are the left and right two successor relations, respectively (S0(v, w) holds iff w = v0 and S1(v, w) holds iff w = v1). The language of MSO over ({0, 1} * , S0, S1) contains first-order variables x, y, . . . ranging over elements of {0, 1}
* and secondorder variables X, Y, . . . ranging over subsets of {0, 1}
* . Atomic formulas have the form x = y, S0(x, y), S1(x, y) and x ∈ X. The language of MSO has the usual boolean connectives and the quantifiers ∃x, ∃X.
Games
We will be concerned with games in which winning conditions take the form of boolean combinations of Σ 
Note that in ACA0 a (Σ 0 2 )1 formula is the same thing as a Π 0 2 formula, in the sense that for every (Σ 2 )x formula ϕ(f ), again, possibly with other parameters (in accordance with the conventions from descriptive set theory, the boldface font serves precisely to indicate the possible presence of parameters). The game is played by two players, 0 and 1, who alternately choose natural numbers f (0), f (1), . . ., building an infinite sequence f ∈ N N . Player 0 wins the game if ϕ(f ) holds, and player 1 wins otherwise. The notions of a strategy and winning strategy for each player are defined as usual. The game given by ϕ(f ) is determined if one of the players has a winning strategy. For precise definitions, see e.g. (Kechris 1995) .
2 )x-Det * is the same statement restricted to games in the Cantor space {0, 1}
N instead of the Baire space N N , that is to games where the players are required to choose only numbers from {0, 1} in each move.
On the other hand, it easily follows from (Nemoto et al. 2007, Lemma 4 
2 )x-Det. So, we have:
A parity game of index (0, x) is a tuple G = V ∃ , V ∀ , vI , E, rk , where: V ∃ and V ∀ are disjoint sets with union V := V ∃ ∪ V ∀ ; vI is an element of V ; E ⊆ V 2 is such that for every v ∈ V there is some w with (v, w) ∈ E; and the rank function rk is a function from V to {0, . . . , x}. The game is played on the arena V by the two players ∃ and ∀. The game starts in the initial position vI ; and if it reaches position v ∈ Vp, p ∈ {∃, ∀}, then player p moves to some w such that (v, w) ∈ E. Formally, a play of G is a sequence vi i∈N such that v0 = vI and (vi, vi+1) ∈ E for all i. Player ∃ wins the play exactly if lim inf i∈N rk(vi) is even.
2 )x-Det implies that all parity games of index (0, x) are determined. However, we also need a stronger notion of determinacy. A positional strategy (also known as a memoryless strategy) for ∃ (resp. ∀) is a function σ from V ∃ (resp. V ∀ ) into V such that for all v in the domain, (v, σ(v)) ∈ E. A positional strategy σ is winning if the player using σ wins every play consistent with σ. The game G is positionally determined if one of the two players has a positional winning strategy. Basic notions related to parity games come originally from (Emerson and Jutla 1991) .
Definition 2.12 (treelike parity games). A parity game G is treelike if V = {0, 1} * , V ∃ = i∈N {0, 1} 2i , and (v, w) ∈ E iff w = v0 or w = v1.
Our notion of (Σ 0 2 )x formula was chosen to make the proof of the following lemma rather straightforward. A proof will be contained in the full version of the paper, cf. (Kołodziejczyk and Michalewski 2016) . Lemma 2.13. ACA0 proves that for every x, (Σ 0 2 )x-Det * holds if and only if all treelike parity games of index (0, x) are positionally determined.
Complementation: first take
In this section, we begin to study the logical strength of the complementation theorem for nondeterministic tree automata. We prove that the theorem implies ∀x[(Σ 0 2 )x-Det] and is in turn implied by the positional determinacy of all parity games.
The proofs of our implications work in ACA0 and, unlike the proofs in later sections of this paper, do not rely on any earlier results related to the logical strength of determinacy principles.
Theorem 3.1. ACA0 proves the implications (1) ⇒ (2) and (2) ⇒ (3) for:
(1) all parity games are positionally determined, (2) for every nondeterministic tree automaton A there exists a nondeterministic tree automaton B such that for any tree T ,
, or equivalently, all treelike parity games are positionally determined.
Remark. It would be possible to give a somewhat technical definition of a class of games whose positional determinacy can be proved equivalent to the complementation theorem by the arguments used to prove Theorem 3.1. However, we refrain from doing that since we are later able to improve Theorem 3.1 to a nicer equivalence result, namely Theorem 5.1.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. (1) ⇒ (2). We formalize a standard proof of the complementation theorem for tree automata, similar e.g. to the one in (Thomas 1997) . Let A = {ΣA, QA, q I A , ∆A, rkA} be a nondeterministic parity tree automaton. We may assume w.l.o.g. that for each a ∈ ΣA, q ∈ QA, there is at least one transition in ∆A of the form (q, a, ·, ·). This is because A can be easily modified so as to satisfy this condition without changing the class of accepted trees.
Given a labelled binary tree T , consider the following game GA,T between two players, Automaton and Pathfinder. The set of Automaton's positions is {0, 1} * × QA, with (∅, q I A ) the starting position. The set of Pathfinder's positions is {0, 1} * × ∆A. Given a position (w, q), Automaton can choose a transition from q, that is, move to the position (w, δ), where ∆A δ = (q, T (w), q0, q1). Pathfinder responds by deciding which direction to take from w, that is, by moving either to position (w0, q0) or to (w1, q1). A play of the game induces a sequence of states qi i∈N ∈ (QA) N , and Automaton wins if and only if lim inf i∈N rkA(qi) is even.
Because of the assumption that A has at least one transition from every letter and state, GA,T can easily be formalized as a parity game.
GA,T is defined in such a way that A accepts T if and only if Automaton has a positional winning strategy. Thus, by positional determinacy, A does not accept T if and only if Pathfinder has a positional winning strategy in GA,T .
Let S be the (finite) set of all maps from ∆A into {0, 1}. Note that a positional strategy for Pathfinder can be represented as a labelled binary tree S such that S(w) ∈ S for all w ∈ {0, 1} * . The strategy is winning if for any choice of transitions δw w∈{0,1} * consistent with the labelling of T , the ranks of states of A appearing on the path determined by S and δw w∈{0,1} * do not satisfy the parity condition.
We will construct an automaton B which accepts a tree T if and only Pathfinder has a positional winning strategy in GA,T . The construction of B proceeds in four standard steps, of which three are elementary and one invokes McNaughton's determinization theorem for word automata (McNaughton 1966) , discussed separately below.
In the first step of the construction we build a deterministic word automaton A1 which accepts all infinite words (si, ai, δi, πi) i∈N in (S × ΣA × ∆A × {0, 1}) N such that if ∀i ∈ N (si(δi) = πi) ( ) and if we define q0 = q I A and qi+1 = δi(ai, qi, πi), then either at some point qi+1 cannot be defined (i.e. δi is not a transition from state qi and letter ai) or
The set of states of A1 is QA ∪ { }, where rkA 1 (q) = rkA(q) + 1 for q ∈ QA 1 and is an additional accepting state (i.e. with rank 0). The transitions are defined in the natural way, except that whenever the rule ( ) is violated or qi+1 cannot be defined, we redirect the computation to state .
In the second step we consider the following property of infinite words (si, ai, πi) i∈N ∈ (S × ΣA × {0, 1}) N : for every sequence δi i∈N ∈ (∆A) N , the word (si, ai, δi, πi) i∈N is accepted by A1. Note that thanks to the fact that A1 is deterministic, the complement of this property is recognized by a nondeterministic word automaton. By determinization of word automata (McNaughton 1966, see below) we can find a deterministic parity word automaton A2 recognizing this property.
In the third step we define a tree automaton A3 over the alphabet S × A such that a tree (S, T ) is accepted if for every infinite path π ∈ {0, 1} N , if (si, ai) i∈N is the sequence of labels appearing on this path, then the infinite word (si, ai, πi) i∈N is accepted by the automaton A2. So, A3 accepts (S, T ) iff S encodes a positional winning strategy for Pathfinder in GA,T . The states of A3 are the same as those of A2, and defining the transition function is unproblematic thanks to the fact that A2 is deterministic.
Finally, in the fourth step we define the nondeterministic tree automaton B as accepting a given tree T over ΣA if there exists a labelling S : {0, 1}
* → S such that the tree (S, T ) is accepted by A3. During its computation on T , B uses nondeterminism to "guess" the labels S(w) for w ∈ {0, 1} * . By construction B accepts T iff Pathfinder has a positional winning strategy in GA,T .
Determinization of word automata. To complete the proof of (1) ⇒ (2), we need to make sure that ACA0 + (1) is able to prove McNaughton's result (McNaughton 1966 ) that every nondeterministic word automaton is equivalent to a deterministic automaton. In fact, this is provable in ACA0 and does not require the full power of ACA0.
The determinization of a nondeterministic word automaton with a parity condition proceeds in two steps. The first is to replace the original automaton by a nondeterministic Büchi automaton (i.e. with index (0, 1)). This is straightforward: assume that the original automaton, say A, has index (0, x), so that A accepts a word if it has a computation in which the lim inf of ranks of states is some odd number y ≤ x. The Büchi automaton B behaves like A, except that it additionally uses nondeterminism to do two things. Firstly, in the very first transition it guesses the value of y. Secondly, at some point in the computation it guesses that states with rank > y will no longer appear; from that point onwards, it assigns rank 0 to states with rank y in A, rank 1 to states with rank < y in A, and aborts the computation if A wants to enter a state with rank > y.
It remains to build a deterministic parity word automation simulating a nondeterministic Büchi word automaton B. This can be carried out by means of the Safra construction, originally due to (Safra 1988) . In the Safra construction, the states of the new deterministic automaton D are certain (bounded-size) trees with vertices labelled by letters from a fixed finite alphabet. The combinatorial details of the construction are a bit involved, but the logical strength engaged is quite modest. The construction of D from B is completely elementary, the proof that acceptance of B implies acceptance of D requires nothing beyond defining number sequences by recursion with an arithmetical condition in the recursion step, and the other direction additionally makes use of König's Lemma in the form known as weak König's Lemma, WKL; all this is wellknown to be readily formalizable in ACA0. (For details of the Safra construction, see e.g. (Piterman 2006; Thomas 1997) 3 .)
Remark. We have not attempted a careful verification, but we believe that the proof of determinization for word automata goes through in the fragment of ACA0 known as WKL0 extended by the induction scheme for Σ 0 2 formulas. Without Σ 0 2 induction, the basic notions of automata theory on infinite structures make little sense, in particular the lim inf of ranks appearing in a computation might not exist.
(2) ⇒ (3). By Proposition 2.11 and Lemma 2.13, it is enough to show that for every x ∈ N, all treelike parity games of index (0, x) are positionally determined. Given fixed x, we can represent treelike parity games with index (0, x) by labelled binary trees over a suitable alphabet Σx. The label of a node v in such a tree should encode the rank of of v in the game, so the alphabet Σx has to contain at least x + 1 symbols. Fix x ∈ N. A tree over Σx representing a treelike game G of index (0, x) has the property W where S represents a positional strategy for player ∃, P represents a potential play of the game, α is a purely existential first-order formula stating that the play P is inconsistent with the strategy S, and each β2y is an ∀∃ ∧ ∃∀ first-order formula stating that 2y is the lim inf of ranks appearing in the play P . The sentence expressing W ∀ 0,x is defined analogously. Now assume (2). It is routine to verify in ACA0 that any quantifier-free expressible property of labelled trees is recognized by a nondeterministic tree automaton. The usual argument by induction on formula complexity (see e.g. (Thomas 1997 , Theorem 6.7, cf. Theorem 3.1)), using (2) in the step for ¬ and the nondeterminism of automata in the step for a block of second-order ∃'s, proves that every property of labelled trees expressible by an MSO sentence with at most 5 quantifier blocks can be recognized by a tree automaton. Hence, for any fixed x there is an automaton Ax recognizing ¬W A labelled tree T is regular if there is some bound d ∈ N with the following property: for every vertex v ∈ {0, 1} * there exists w ∈ {0, 1} <d such that the subtree of T under w is the same as the subtree under v, that is, for all u ∈ {0, 1} * , T (vu) = T (wu). We complete the argument by proving two lemmas about regular trees which together immediately imply that Ax cannot accept any tree, and therefore (3) holds. The first lemma expresses a completely standard fact, whereas the second is interesting only in a context where positional determinacy of treelike parity games is not known in advance.
Lemma 3.2. ACA0 proves that any tree automaton which accepts some tree also accepts a regular tree.
Proof. Let A be a tree automaton of index (0, x). Consider the following parity game GA. The game arena is split into V ∃ = QA and V ∀ = ∆A with q I A as the initial position. When the game is in position q ∈ QA, player ∃ moves to some δ ∈ ∆A of the form (q, a, q , q ) for some a ∈ ΣA, q , q ∈ QA. Now the game is in position δ, and player ∀ decides whether to go left or right, that is, moves to either q or q . Player ∃ wins if the lim inf of ranks of states visited during the play is even (formally this is achieved by setting the ranks of all δ ∈ ∆A to x).
The positional determinacy of parity games on finite arenas is known to be provable even in S 2 2 , a very weak subtheory of ACA0 (Beckmann and Moller 2008) . Moreover, if A accepts some tree T , then player ∃ clearly has a winning strategy in GA, and thus also a positional winning strategy, say σ. Now construct a labelled tree Tσ in the following way: to determine the label T (w) for w ∈ {0, 1} * , simulate a play of GA in which ∃ plays according to σ, ∀ chooses directions so as to reach w, and for each i ≤ lh(w), if δ = (q, a, q , q ) is the transition chosen by ∃, then the label T (w i) equals a. Tσ is accepted by A because σ is a winning strategy. Additionally, Tσ is a regular tree because GA has a finite arena and σ is positional.
Lemma 3.3. ACA0 proves that for each x, the treelike parity game represented by a regular tree T over Σx is determined.
Proof of Lemma 3.3. Let T be a regular tree over Σx encoding a treelike parity game G. Define U to be the set consisting of those v ∈ {0, 1} * for which there is no w length-lexicographically smaller than v such that the lengths of v and w are congruent mod 2 and T (vu) = T (wu) for all u (the additional congruence condition is needed to distinguish between moves of different players). The formula defining U is arithmetical, so U is indeed a set. Moreover, since T is regular, the set U is finite. Consider the following parity game H with arena U : the assignment of positions to players and the ranks of positions are inherited from G, and a move from v to w is possible in H if and only if the subtree of T under w is identical to the subtree under a son vb of v. The game H exists by arithmetical comprehension. By positional determinacy of parity games on finite arenas, H is positionally determined provably in ACA0. Let σH be a positional winning strategy for one of the players, say ∃.
We can use σH to define a positional strategy σG in the game G represented by T : at position v, player ∃ finds the unique vertex w ∈ U such that the lengths of w and v are congruent mod 2 and T under v is the same as T under w, and then moves from v analogously to the move σH would make at w. The strategy σG exists by arithmetical comprehension, and since any play of G consistent with σG corresponds to a play of H consistent with σH , σG is in fact a winning strategy for ∃ in G.
The proofs of the Lemmas conclude the proof of Theorem 3.1.
Determinacy vs comprehension
We now turn our attention to the question which set-theoretic existence axioms are needed to prove the determinacy statements considered in Theorem 3.1. For the statement ∀x[(Σ 0 2 )x-Det], sharp upper and lower bounds on the requisite amount of comprehension follow from earlier work on determinacy statements in secondorder arithmetic, most importantly (Möllerfeld 2002; Heinatsch and Möllerfeld 2010; .
We begin with the upper bound. The following result is a direct corollary of the proof of Theorem 4.3 in (MedSalem and Tanaka In fact, the methods of (Möllerfeld 2002) can be used to prove a strengthening of Theorem 4.2. We state the stronger version, accompanied by a proof sketch, as Theorem 7.1 below. Remark. In (Das and Riba 2015, Section VII A), the authors state that they "suspect" that ∆ 1 2 comprehension in the language of S0, S1 suffices to axiomatize the MSO theory of ({0, 1} * , S0, S1). However, Theorem 4.2 shows that this cannot be the case. The MSO theory of ({0, 1} * , S0, S1) contains, in particular, sentences expressing the determinacy of (Σ 2 -CA0 to the language of S0, S1 satisfies ∆ 1 2 comprehension in that language -however, by the reasoning above, the reduct may have a different MSO theory than the true theory of ({0, 1} * , S0, S1). 2 )n-Det * for all n ∈ ω, as well as
Proof. This follows immediately from Theorem 4.4,
It is worth pointing out that implications between existence of fixpoints and determinacy run also in the other direction. In this context we only mention the following result, which is more than we need in Section 5. Remark. Our proof of Lemma 4.7 is again the formalization of a standard argument in the spirit of the one presented in (Thomas 1997) . We strongly believe that the MedSalem-Tanaka argument showing Theorem 4.4 can be adapted to give a proof of the step from (0, x) to (0, x + 1) in ACA0 + ∆ 1 2 -ID, but we have not attempted to do it.
Proof. Since parity games of index (0, 0) are trivially positionally determined, it is enough to prove the second part of the statement. So, assume that all parity games of index (0, x) are positionally determined and let G = V ∃ , V ∀ , vI , E, rk be a game of index (0, x + 1). For each v ∈ V , we will write Gv to denote a game defined just like G but with starting position v instead of vI . Π 1 2 -comprehension guarantees the existence of the set W ∀ = {v : player ∀ has a positional winning strategy in Gv}.
Let U be V \ W ∀ . Our aim is to prove that player ∃ has a positional winning strategy in Gv for each v ∈ U . Of course, this will in particular imply the positional determinacy of G. We first prove a useful claim.
Claim. Player ∀ has a single positional strategy σ ∀ which is winning in each Gv for v ∈ W ∀ . Moreover, each play of Gv, v ∈ W ∀ , consistent with σ ∀ never leaves W ∀ .
To see that the claim is true, note that by Theorem 2.2 we can apply Σ 1 2 -AC to conclude that there exists a sequence of positional strategies σv v∈W ∀ such that σv is winning for p in Gv. Π 1 1 -comprehension implies the existence of a sequence Uv v∈W ∀ such that for each v, Uv = {w ∈ W ∀ : σw is winning for ∀ in Gv}.
Observe that Uv is nonempty for each
arbitrarily. Given a play vi i∈N consistent with σ ∀ and such that v0 ∈ W ∀ , we can prove by induction on i that vi ∈ W ∀ and that the sequence min(Uv i ) i∈N is nonincreasing. Thus, from some round i onwards the play is actually consistent with some fixed strategy σw which is winning for ∀ in Gv i . This proves the Claim.
Note that for v ∈ U ∩ V ∀ , all edges from v must lead to vertices in U . The Claim also implies that for v ∈ U ∩ V ∃ , at least one edge from v must lead to a vertex in U .
Let N be the set U ∩ rk −1 [{0}] . Consider the following ∆ 1 2 (in fact, arithmetical) formula ϕ(x, X):
∨ (x ∈ V ∃ and there exists an edge from x into X)
∨ (x ∈ V ∀ and all edges from x lead into X).]
Theorem 2.6 implies the existence of an inductively generated fixed point P of the operation X → {x ∈ N : ϕ(x, X)} ∪ X and the corresponding prewellordering . Since X appears in ϕ only positively, it is easily checked that P is in fact the least fixed point of X → {x ∈ N : ϕ(x, X)} and x ∈ P ⇔ ϕ(x, {y : y ≺ x}).
Note that ∃ has a positional strategy π on P \ N such that π guarantees reaching a vertex in N in finitely many steps and staying inside P until that happens. The strategy is defined by: π(v) = the ≤-smallest w such that (v, w) ∈ E and w ≺ v (this is well-defined on P \ N unless N = ∅, in which case P = ∅ as well). Now let R be U \ P . Note that for v ∈ R ∩ V ∃ , all edges from v must lead to vertices in W ∀ ∪ R, while for v ∈ R ∩ V ∀ , at least one edge from v must lead to a vertex in R. So, it makes sense to consider the parity game G R obtained by restricting G to the induced subgraph on R. All vertices in R have ranks from {1, . . . , x + 1}, so by the inductive assumption each game (G R)v for v ∈ R is positionally determined. It is not hard to check, using the Claim, that a positional winning strategy for ∀ in (G R)v would also give a positional winning strategy for ∀ in Gv, so in fact it is player ∃ who wins each (G R)v . By an obvious analogue of our Claim for (G R)v , this means that ∃ has a single positional strategy ρ which wins (G R)v for each v ∈ R.
Define a positional strategy σ ∃ for ∃ as follows:
It is easy to verify that for each v ∈ U , σ ∃ is winning for ∃ in Gv.
Complementation: full result
It turns out that implications from determinacy to set existence axioms (for instance in the form of Theorem 4.6), along with "positionalization of winning strategies" techniques developed in automata theory, make it possible to reverse implication (2) ⇒ (3) of Theorem 3.1. In other words, we can prove:
Theorem 5.1. The following are equivalent over ACA0:
2) for every nondeterministic tree automaton A there exists a nondeterministic tree automaton B such that for any tree T , B accepts T iff A does not accept T .
Our proof of Theorem 5.1 is essentially an just analysis of the arguments in (Klarlund 1994; Klarlund and Kozen 1995) . Here we provide only a very brief sketch; a more detailed analysis will be presented in the full version of the paper, cf. (Kołodziejczyk and Michalewski 2016) .
Proof sketch. Clearly, it is enough to show that in the AutomatonPathfinder games described in the proof of Theorem 3.1, a winning strategy for Pathfinder can be improved by a positional winning strategy provably in ACA0 + ∀x[(Σ 0 2 )x-Det].
To prove this, we analyze the technique developed by Klarlund and Kozen in (Klarlund 1994; Klarlund and Kozen 1995) . (Klarlund 1994; Klarlund and Kozen 1995) work with automata equipped not with a parity condition but the more general Streett condition: given a finite set {(Rχ, Iχ) : χ ∈ C} of pairs of subsets of Q, the automaton accepts if for every path π and every χ such that the states along π are in Rχ infinitely often, the states along π are also in Iχ infinitely often. Pathfinder's winning condition in GA,T is then the dual Rabin condition: there is some χ ∈ C such that states in Rχ appear infinitely often but states in Iχ do not. Pathfinder's strategy σ is winning if the graph GA,T σ of possible plays in GA,T consistent with σ satisfies the same Rabin condition, in the sense that the condition holds on each infinite path through the graph.
The main result of Klarlund and Kozen (Klarlund and Kozen 1995, Theorem 1) is that a graph satisfies a Rabin condition if and only if it admits a Rabin measure: a well-behaved mapping into a certain kind of tree with no infinite branches and with a well-order on the set of sons of each node. Analysis of the proof reveals that while the straightforward (⇐) direction goes through smoothly in ACA0, the more subtle (⇒) direction apparently goes beyond ACA0 but requires only Σ The paper (Klarlund and Kozen 1995) applies Rabin measures to the specific problem of positionalizing strategies. For a game GA,T in which Pathfinder has a winning strategy σ, (Klarlund and Kozen 1995, Theorem 1) guarantees the existence of a Rabin measure on GA,T σ . An ingenious modification of GA,T σ produces a graph which corresponds to a positional strategy for Pathfinder, but still retains a Rabin measure; so by (Klarlund and Kozen 1995, Theorem 1) again, the strategy is winning. Nothing in this argument goes beyond ACA0.
Remark. The fixed point construction needed in (Klarlund and Kozen 1995) can actually be carried out in Π 
Decidability
Theorem 5.1, combined with the results discussed in Section 4, leads to an easy argument showing that ∆ 1 3 -CA0 is not only unable to prove the complementation theorem for tree automata, but also unable to prove the decidability of the MSO theory of the infinite binary tree by any other method.
Theorem 6.1. ACA0 proves the implications (1) ⇒ (2n), for all n ∈ ω, and ACA0 + ∆ 1 2 -ID (thus also Π 1 2 -CA0) proves the implications (2n) ⇒ (1) for all 3 ≤ n ∈ ω, where:
2n) there is a Turing machine t which halts on every input and accepts exactly the Π 1 n sentences of MSO true in ({0, 1} * , S0, S1).
Remark. In an "ideal version" of Theorem 6.1, the statements (2n) would be replaced by a single statement (2): "there is a Turing machine t which halts on every input and accepts exactly the sentences of MSO true in ({0, 1} * , S0, S1)". However, by Tarski's theorem on the undefinability of truth, the natural way of expressing "sentence ϕ is true in ({0, 1} * , S0, S1)" as a property of the variable ϕ cannot be formalized in the language of secondorder arithmetic. On the other hand, it is possible to formulate a truth definition for Π 1 n sentences, in particular for Π 1 n sentences of MSO; as Theorem 6.1 shows, the case n = 3 is crucial here.
Proof. Both directions of the proof rely on ideas similar to those in the proof of (2) ⇒ (3) in Theorem 3.1.
(1) ⇒ (2n). By Theorem 5.1, (1) implies the complementation theorem for nondeterministic tree automata. Moreover, the implication goes through in ACA0.
Just like in the proof of (2) ⇒ (3) in Theorem 3.1, complementation for tree automata makes it possible to formalize the usual algorithm constructing an automaton equivalent to an MSO formula ϕ on all labelled binary trees. Given a fixed n ∈ ω, the correctness of this algorithm restricted to ϕ ∈ Π 1 n is easily verified in ACA0. It remains to have a procedure to deciding whether a given tree automaton A accepts any tree at all. This is equivalent to the problem whether player ∃ wins the game GA described in the proof of Lemma 3.2, and determining the winner of a parity game on a finite arena is a decidable problem provably well within ACA0 (Beckmann and Moller 2008) .
(23) ⇒ (1) As discussed in the proof of Theorem 3.1, for each x ∈ N there is a Π 1 3 MSO sentence ψx expressing the positional determinacy of treelike parity games of index (0, x). By Lemma 2.13, ψx is true in {0, 1}
* exactly if (Σ 0 2 )x-Det * holds. Let t be given by (23). For each x, t(ψx) = yes exactly if (Σ 0 2 )x-Det * holds. Therefore, by Corollary 4.4, t(ψ0) = yes and for every x, t(ψx) = yes implies t(ψx+1) = yes.
By arithmetical comprehension, X = {x : t(ψx) = yes} exists as a set. Since X contains 0 and is closed under successor, we conclude that X = N. Therefore each ψx is true in {0, 1}
* and so we have ∀x[(Σ 
Rabin's theorem as a reflection principle
Our aim now is to prove that over Π 1 2 -CA0, Rabin's decidability theorem, the complementation for nondeterministic tree automata, and the determinacy statements appearing in Theorem 3.1 are all equivalent to a logical reflection principle stating that all Π 1 3 sentences provable in Π 1 2 -CA0 are true. Our proofs in this section rely in an essential way on both the results and the techniques of Möllerfeld's thesis (Möllerfeld 2002) . At present we see no way of avoiding reliance on these advanced techniques.
We first notice that slight changes to the argument of (Möller-feld 2002) yield a strengthening of Theorem 4.2.
Theorem 7.1. Over ACA0, the theory {(Σ 0 2 )n-Det : n ∈ ω} axiomatizes the Π Proof sketch. There is a well-known correspondence between sufficiently strong fragments of second-order arithmetic and weak systems of set theory formulated in the usual set-theoretic language L∈ (cf. for instance (Simpson 2009, Chapter VII.3) ). L∈ is translated into L2 by letting the ∈-structure of sets be represented by well-founded trees contained in N . The inverse translation is the obvious one: ∃x becomes ∃x ∈ ω set , and ∃X becomes ∃x ⊆ ω set . (Here we use the symbol ω set for the usual set-theoretic definition of the natural numbers as formalized in L∈. This should not be confused with our use of ω in the earlier sections.) Π 1 2 -CA0 corresponds to the set theory Lim( 1), which consists of the basic axioms known as BT r (extensionality, pair, union, ∆0-separation, and set foundation) and the axiom ∀x ∃y [x ∈ y ∧ y ≺1 V], where y ≺1 V means: "y is a transitive set, and for allā ∈ y and Σ1 formulas ϕ (of L∈), ϕ(ā) iff y |= ϕ(ā)". Now assume that Π 1 2 -CA0 proves the Π 1 3 sentence π. It follows that Lim( 1) implies the set-theoretic translation π * of π. As written, π * is a Π3 sentence of L∈:
with δ a bounded formula of L∈. However, Lim( 1) proves the so-called Axiom β, which is a variant of the Mostowski collapse lemma: it states that any transitive relation r on a set a can be homomorphically mapped onto the set membership relation on some set b. (A statement of Axiom β, and a sketch of a proof in a subtheory of Lim( 1), can be found for instance in (Pohlers 2009, Chapter 11.6 ).) Using Axiom β, the Π 1 1 formula ∀z ⊆ ω set δ(x, y, z), which is equivalent to the statement that a certain relation rx,y parametrized by x, y is well-founded, can provably in Lim( 1) be rewritten in a Σ1 way: "there exists a Mostowski collapse of rx,y". Furthermore, the existence of a Mostowski collapse of rx,y implies the well-foundedness of rx,y already in the weaker theory BT r (thanks to the set foundation axiom). What this means is that there is a Π2 sentence π * such that
By (Möllerfeld 2002, Theorem 10.4) , every Π2 sentence of L∈ provable in Lim(≺1) is also provable in a certain extension BTσ r of BT r . In particular, BTσ r proves π * and therefore also π * . However, by (Möllerfeld 2002, Theorem 8.15 ), every L2 sentence whose translation is provable in a theory Ref ⊇ BTσ r is itself provable in an arithmetic version of the µ-calculus, which by (Heinatsch and Möllerfeld 2010 ) is in turn conservative over ACA0 + {(Σ 0 2 )n-Det : n ∈ ω}.
Even though Theorem 7.1 concerns relatively strong theories, the work in (Heinatsch and Möllerfeld 2010; Möllerfeld 2002) involved in its proof relies only on (sketches of) explicit primitive recursive constructions of proofs in various formal theories and, at one point, the cut elimination theorem for first-order logic. Therefore, we have the following corollary of the proof. (1) all parity games are positionally determined, (2) ∀x[(Σ 0 2 )x-Det], (3) for every nondeterministic tree automaton A there exists a nondeterministic tree automaton B such that for any tree T , B accepts T iff A does not accept T , (4n) there is a Turing machine t which halts on every input and accepts exactly the Π Proof. Given Theorems 3.1 and 6.1, it is enough to prove the implications (5) ⇒ (1) and (2) ⇒ (5). We reason in Π 
Further work
Positionalization in ACA0 Our proof of Theorem 5.1 relies on the Klarlund-Kozen method of building positional strategies, which does not formalize in ACA0. Is it possible to positionalize strategies (without assuming determinacy) in ACA0, perhaps using the approach of (Jutla 1997)?
Büchi's theorem Büchi's Theorem states that nondeterministic word automata are closed under complementation (this implies the decidability of the MSO theory of (N, ≤)). Because ACA0 proves that word automata can be determinized (cf. the proof of Theorem 3.1), also Büchi's Theorem is provable within ACA0. However, what is the exact reverse-mathematical strength of the theorem?
Weak MSO over the binary tree Can statements related to the decidability of the weak MSO theory of the infinite binary tree be characterized as determinacy principles, for instance as the determinacy of Boolean combinations of open games?
MSO over R In (Shelah 1975) it shown that the MSO theory of the real line with the natural ordering is undecidable. However, once the quantification is restricted to Fσ sets, the theory is decidable (Rabin 1969) . Is there a proof of this decidability result not relying on the full strength of Rabin's theorem?
